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     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
     SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     MARK KUSHNEIR,
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                    Plaintiff,
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                                            14 Civ. 9148 (JLR)
                V.
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     THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,
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                                            Conference
                    Defendants.
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                                            New York, N.Y.
                                            December 13, 2023
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                                            11:15 a.m.
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     Before:
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                        HON. JENNIFER L. ROCHON,
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                                            District Judge
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                               APPEARANCES
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     GIDEON O. OLIVER, ESQ.
          Attorney for Plaintiff
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     COHEN&GREEN P.L.L.C.
          Attorneys for Plaintiff
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     BY: J. REMY GREEN, ESQ.
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     NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
     OFFICE OF THE CORPORATION COUNSEL
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          Attorneys for Defendants
     BY: HANNAH V. FADDIS, ESQ.
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          JOSEPH A. RUSSO, ESQ.
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          Assistant Corporation Counsel
     ALSO PRESENT: REGINA YU, Law Clerk (Plaintiff)
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correct, Ms. Faddis?

MS. FADDIS: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. So if a defendant doesn't open the door, plaintiff is precluded from eliciting testimony regarding indemnification.

The next item from plaintiff is the Court should not give a nominal damages instruction because the plaintiff is not requesting one. Can I have some argument from you, Mr. Oliver, or Mx. Green, if there's anything you'd like to add to your papers. I do have quite a bit, but if there's anything you need.

MR. OLIVER: I don't think so, your Honor. I would add the last trial that opposing counsel and I did together, the same issue came up in front of Judge Wood and Judge Wood did not give a nominal damages instruction. I'm not sure I mentioned that in the papers. Beyond that, I think I'll rely on the papers.

THE COURT: Okay. And it's your position that nominal damages are appropriate in this case, you just are strategically not choosing to request nominal damages; is that correct?

MR. OLIVER: I'm not sure they are appropriate in this case, but strategically, we are requesting that they not be added. Yes.

THE COURT: Ms. Faddis, anything you want to add to

your papers, including the recent Judge Wood case?

MS. FADDIS: No, your Honor. I will say off the top of my head I know we have had cases on the other side where the courts have given a nominal damages instruction over plaintiff's objection. A case doesn't come to mind, but I know it's happened. So it does go both ways. I don't think I have anything else to say in addition to our papers at this point.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

At this point I am going to give a nominal damages charge, and let me explain a little bit more.

The defendant opposes the motion in limine and argues that nominal damages must be awarded where the plaintiff proves there's a violation of a constitutional right but has not proven any compensatory damages. And plaintiff, from the papers, is not suggesting that nominal damages can't be awarded for a false arrest claim, and indeed says "a nominal damages charge is available for plaintiffs for their benefit." But instead the plaintiff is asking the Court to exclude the charge at plaintiff's option so that the jury does not compromise an award of nominal damages.

I agree with the defendant that it would not adequately inform the jury of the law if a nominal damages charge was omitted. I am not persuaded by plaintiff's reliance on—and sole reliance on—Vilkhu v. City of New York, 2009 WL 537495 (E.D.N.Y. March 3, 2009) for the proposition that

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plaintiff can strategically elect to remove the option of nominal damages from the jury's consideration to avoid the risk of a compromised verdict by the jury. And insofar as Vilkhu stands for such a proposition, I disagree with it. The court is obligated to present a jury charge that "adequately informs the jury as to the correct legal standard." Norville v. Staten Island University Hospital, 196 F.3d 89, 100 (2d Cir. 1999). "If a jury finds that a constitutional violation has been proven but that the plaintiff has not shown injury sufficient to warrant award of compensatory damages, it is plain error to instruct the jury merely that, having found a violation, it may [rather than must] award nominal damages." Robinson v. Cattaraugus County, 147 F.3d at 162. Indeed, in Robinson, the Second Circuit held that it was plain error for the district court to charge that the jury may, rather than must, award nominal damages, even though the plaintiff had not even objected to the charge. Again, plaintiff is not arguing that nominal damages cannot be awarded for false arrest or for the false arrest here and instead argues that he should have the strategic choice to take it off the table and take off the table the jury's option to award such damages so that it is discouraged from compromising in its verdict. The Court will always presume that the jury will follow the law as charged. CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Hensley, 129 S. Ct. 2139 (2009). Therefore, the Court will charge the jury on proximate cause

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and compensatory damages, including that loss of liberty is a compensable damage for false arrest. Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 132 (2d Cir. 2004). Should the jury find that plaintiff suffered compensable damages that were proximately caused by a constitutional violation, they will be instructed on awarding damages and can certainly do so, including damages related to a loss of liberty. However, omitting a nominal damages charge if the jury finds that plaintiff has not suffered compensable damages in order to steer the jury away from an award of nominal damages, as plaintiff seems to be suggesting, would be misleading to the jury as to the state of the law. As the court stated in Randolph v. Metropolitan Transit Authority, 2019 WL 1567663, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2019), in rejecting the argument that a nominal damages charge should not have been given, the court stated, this may give "the jury a false signal regarding the impact of their verdict on a plaintiff's right and force them wrongly to conclude that they had to make an award of compensatory damages, even where the evidence did not warrant one." The Second Circuit's summary affirmance of Vilkhu for "substantially the reasons" set forth by the district court in Vilkhu v. City of New York, 372 F. App'x 222, 223 (2d Cir. Apr. 21, 2010) does not provide contrary guidance because the district court presented multiple grounds in support of rejecting the objection for failure to present a nominal

damages charge, including that the defendants were not prejudiced by the missing instruction, given the high actual damages awarded. Therefore, that summary affirmance does not persuade the Court otherwise or require the Court to hold otherwise. Therefore, at this point I will include a nominal damages charge in the jury charge. I will think more about it after I hear all of the evidence that comes in at trial to make sure that that instruction is still appropriate after the evidence has come in, but I'm not going to foreclose it based on a choice at this point.

Any questions, Mr. Oliver?

MR. OLIVER: No question. Just an objection on the record.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. OLIVER: Thank you.

THE COURT: Yes. Absolutely. Objection is noted.

Anything else, Ms. Faddis?

MS. FADDIS: No, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

The next motion in limine from the plaintiff is that defendants should not be allowed to introduce evidence contrary to the city's 30(b)(6) testimony. I am not sure that I can rule on this. I don't know what testimony is being sought to preclude. I will say that if any witness is providing testimony that varies from their deposition testimony, their